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We ask whether production related subsidies have a role to play in explaining Chinese
firms’ export performance. We, firstly, implement an estimation approach that allows for
both direct and indirect (”spillover”) effects of the subsidy on the probability to export.
Secondly, our approach enables us to allow these two effects to differ depending on the
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1 Introduction
According to the WTO’s Integrated Data Base (IDB), China ran trade surpluses with 169
countries in 2016. The most striking of these trade imbalances is, of course, between the US
and China. This has arguably contributed greatly to the recent trade war between the two
countries. One of the reasons for this is the perceived unfair competition due to China’s use of
state subsidies. Indeed, China is frequently noted for its policy of subsidizing firms in specifically
targeted industries, such as electric cars, steel, or solar panels (e.g., Haley and Haley, 2013).1
We look at the use of such production-related subsidies and ask whether they have a role to
play in explaining Chinese firms’ export performance. These subsidies effectively reduce firms’
costs, which may enable them to enter into exporting. Building on earlier work that estimated
the direct treatment effect of subsidy receipt on the receiving firm’s export performance (Girma
et al., 2009, Görg et al., 2008) we expand this literature in a number of ways. Firstly, we set
out an estimation approach that allows for both direct and indirect (”spillover”) effects of
the subsidy on the probability to export of both treated and non-treated firms, respectively.
Secondly, our approach enables us to allow these two treatment effects to differ depending on
the share of firms that already receive subsidies in a well-specified cluster. These two issues
have, to the best of our knowledge, not been considered in evaluations of subsidies on export
performance.2
The estimation of the treatment effects is complicated by the fact that we are likely to
have selection at two levels. Firstly, subsidy receipt by a firm is unlikely to be random, as
government may target particular firms. Secondly, the distribution of subsidized firms across
clusters is also difficult to justify as random, as government policy may favour certain regions
and / or industries. We employ the estimation technique developed in Girma et al. (2015)
which deals with both types of selection in two steps using propensity score matching methods.
We modify a heterogenous firm model to motivate the expectation that the direct and
indirect effects depend on the share of subsidized firms in a cluster. Details of this are in the
appendix. In our model, subsidies to a firm reduce their marginal cost of production and go
hand in hand with a reduction in the variable cost of exporting. Subsidies are given to firms
after they enter the local market but before they decide whether or not to export. In this model
set up, there are positive direct treatment effects, since subsidized firms have lower effective
marginal cost than non-subsidized firms in a cluster. This means that more subsidized firms
will be able to overcome the foreign market entry hurdle, which translates into a higher share
1See also the Financial Times at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a55e7d36-db8a-11e5-a72f-
1e7744c66818.html#%axzz4BeAlJ6Ax and http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6d4e6408-5e68-11e2-b3cb-
00144feab49a.html#%axzz4BeAlJ6Ax (accessed 27/03/19).
2In the theoretical model we work with a combination of a production subsidy and a trade cost (for those
same subsidized firms) which depends on the number of subsidized firms in a cluster. The latter is in effect an
export promotion activity. Export promotion has been investigated by, e.g., van Biesebroeck et al., 2015 and
Martincus and Carballo, 2008, 2010. These studies, also focus on direct effects but neglect spillovers and the
possible interaction with the presence of treated firms in a cluster.
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of exporters. In addition, the direct subsidy effect depends positively on the share of subsidized
firms s in the cluster. This comes from the trade costs for subsidized firms, which decrease in
s.
The model also shows that there is a negative indirect treatment effect, which increases in
absolute value in s. Subsidising firms increases competition and makes it more difficult for non-
subsidized firms in a cluster with subsidies to become exporters. The share of exporting firms
among the non-subsidized firms in a cluster with subsidies is therefore lower in comparison to a
cluster without subsidies. This effect is aggravated by an increasing share of subsidized firms.
2 Data
We examine these predictions using firm level data from the Chinese manufacturing industry
from the Annual Reports of Industrial Enterprise Statistics, compiled by the China National
Bureau of Statistics. The dataset covers all firms in China with an annual turnover of more
than 5 million Renminbi (about $800,000). These companies account for an estimated 85-90
percent of total output in most industries. For the purpose of this analysis, we have information
on more than 170,000 firms for the period 2004-2006.
The dataset provides information on whether or not firms received production-related sub-
sidies. We use this to define our treatment as a firm having received such production subsidies
in 2005. The outcome variable is measured as a dummy whether or not a firm exports in 2006.
We define clusters based on 245 towns.
Table 1 provides the definition and summary statistics of pre-treatment covariates by treat-
ment status.
[Table 1 here]
Table 2 provides some summary statistics of the cluster level variables. Table 3 shows that
the proportion of subsidized firms exhibits significant (unconditional) correlations with most
of the cluster level variables, providing suggestive evidence of the importance of controlling for
cluster level observables.
[Tables 2 and 3 here]
3 Empirical framework
We briefly outline the estimation framework here, with more details in the appendix and in
Girma et al. (2015). To deal with the two levels of selection we proceed in two steps.
In the first step, we estimate the relationship between subsidy receipt and probability to
export separately for each cluster, using firm level data. Doing so by cluster allows us to
investigate whether the treatment effects differ across clusters, as we would expect from our
theoretical model.
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We regress the firm level export dummy in 2006 on the treatment status in 2005. The
outcome equation is estimated using inverse propensity score weighted regression to allow for
selection of subsidy receipt. The firm level propensity score is generated using a logistic re-
gression of the treatment status on firm level characteristics pre-treatment (i.e., 2004). This is
done separately for each cluster.
From these cluster-by-cluster regressions we can calculate predicted values of the probability
to export for both treatment statuses (treated and non-treated) for each cluster.
These so-calculated cluster level average potential outcomes are then used as dependent
variable in a second step estimation. In this step, the proportion of treated firms in a cluster
(s̄) is taken as treatment variable. As this treatment variable is continuous and bounded
between 0 and 1 we employ a generalised propensity score method to identify the causal effect
of the treatment. The propensity score is generated conditional on pre-treatment characteristics
of the cluster.3
Based on this we can then calculate average potential outcomes for different levels of s̄ which
are used to estimate the direct and indirect treatment effects parameters, using insights from
the recent statistical literature (e.g. Hudgens & Halloran, 2008). Firstly, we can calculate a
direct effect γ̄10ss = ȳ
1
s − ȳ0s as the difference in the probability to export between subsidized (1)
and non-subsidized (0) firms for a given share of subsidized firms s in a cluster. The indirect
effect is γ̄00s0 = ȳ
0
s − ȳ00, hence, the difference in export probability between non-subsidized firms
(0) in a cluster s and in a cluster without any subsidized firms (0).
4 Empirical results
The estimated direct and indirect treatment effects are plotted in Figure 1. The graph also
shows the associated 95% confidence intervals. The results provide a number of important
insights.
[Figure 1 here]
Firstly, as regards the direct treatment effect, we find that this is always positive and differs
significantly according to the share of subsidized firms in a cluster. For clusters with low levels
of treated firms, the direct effect is positive and increasing in s as predicted by theory. A look
at the point estimates shows that for a cluster with five percent treated firms, receipt of a
subsidy increases the probability to export by about 6 percent. This effect increases to about
15 percent in a cluster with 30 percent of subsidized firms.
This increase in the positive effects is in line with our theoretical discussion. Trade related
subsidies increase in the share of subsidized firms in the cluster, thus making the firms already
receiving marginal cost subsidies more likely to export relative to non-subsidized firms.
3As we have selection-on-observables in both steps, we of course also perform balancing tests. These are also
described in the appendix.
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For clusters with more than 30 percent of subsidized firms we find that the direct treatment
effect remains positive but decreases with s. While not captured in our model framework, such
decreasing positive effect is consistent with the idea that in clusters with high levels of subsidized
firms, subsidies can distort the efficient allocation of resources within the subsidized firms and
thus lead to a worsening of firm performance. Our results would indicate that this effect only
sets in at fairly high levels of subsidy receipt, however. Actually the share of subsidized firms is
less than 30 percent in 90 percent of the clusters, in this range the direct effect is monotonic.4
Turning to the indirect treatment effect, we find that it is negative and differs depending on
the share of treated firms. A negative indirect treatment effect is in line with our theoretical
prediction. A cluster with subsidized firms is a more difficult environment for the non-subsidized
firms, as a result they are less likely to find it profitable to export. The model also predicts that
the negative effect should increase (in absolute terms) with increasing shares of treated firms
in a cluster. This is true in our results for clusters of up to 20 percent share of treated firms.
For higher levels of treated firms in a cluster, the negative effect decreases in absolute terms
but remains negative. The theory could explain such non-monotonicity of the indirect spillover
effect if the size of the firm-specific subsidy were to decrease with the number of subsidized
firms for s > 0.2.5,6
5 Conclusion
Our estimation results put in question the potential role of production related subsidies in
stimulating exports. We find that the direct effect of subsidies is always positive, it is in-
creasing for firms in clusters with low levels of subsidisation, but diminishes for high levels of
subsidization. Furthermore, subsidising firms has a negative impact on the export propensity
of non-subsidized firms. This effect becomes stronger with a higher proportion of subsidized
firms in a cluster. For a very large share of subsidized firms the effect decreases but remains
negative. Based on these results it is questionable whether such production related subsidies
have a large role to play in explaining Chinese firms’ export performance.
4We assume in the theoretical part that ∂τ∂s is negative and sufficiently small. If for s > 0.3 the derivative
becomes sufficiently close to zero or positive the theory would generate the non-monotonicity of the direct effect,
namely a positive and decreasing spillover effect.
5The empirical construction of clusters is not an exact science. One needs to strike a balance between having
a large enough number of clusters and sufficient observations per cluster. Also, clusters should be constructed
in such a way as to maximize the potential of intra-cluster spillovers, while at the same time minimize possible
inter-cluster externalities. Redefining clusters based on four-digit industries instead of towns produces the result
depicted in Figure 1b. It also shows positive direct effects and negative indirect effects, both of which differ
with the share of subsidized firms in the cluster.
6Dai et al. (2017) show that export processors are less productive than ordinary exporters and, more
importantly, than non-exporters. They attribute this, at first counter-intuitive finding to the fact that the least
productive firms choose to do export processing, as the fixed costs involved and level of production technology
employed are relatively low. Using data similar to Dai et al. (2017) we also distinguish export processors and
ordinary exporters. Figures 2 and 3 in the appendix show separate results for the two types of firms and we
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Notes: Size, age, productivity, returns on assets and debt are defined as the cluster-level
average values. Out of the original 245 clusters, 41 were lost because of common support
conditions (see Appendix A4 for detail).
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A.1 Model details
We develop an open economy model with heterogeneous firms, where a government subsidizes
firms by reducing their marginal cost of market entry. The subsidy is financed through a lump
sum tax and is given to firms randomly after they have entered the local market but before
they have made the decision on whether to export. The number of workers is normalized to one






α . Demand for product ω is d(ω) and the elasticity of substitution
between products σ = 1/(1− α) > 1 is defined by 0 < α < 1. Solving the consumers’ problem
yields the usual demand d(ω) = p(ω)
−σ
P 1−σ
C, with p(ω) being the price of the product, C being





1−σ the aggregate price index.
To develop a new product firms pay a fixed cost F , following which they draw marginal cost
a from a Pareto distribution with a probability density function g(a) with support [0, a] and
a cumulative density function G(a)≡
∫ a
0
g(a)da = (a/a)k, where k > σ − 1. In order to enter
their home market firms need to pay another fixed cost FL. This naturally creates a marginal
cost threshold aL, which separates firms that enter and produce from those that do not.
Firms have the option to enter the foreign market as exporters. Before they decide on that
however they learn whether they will be receiving a subsidy or not. The effective marginal
cost of subsidized firms is a′ ≡ κa, where 0 < κ < 1 is the parameter which determines the
size of the per-unit subsidy a− κa. In order to enter the foreign market a firm needs to pay a
fixed cost FE > FL, which creates two more marginal cost cutoffs aES dividing exporting from
non-exporting subsidized firms and aEN dividing exporting from non-exporting, non-subsidized
firms. In addition to paying a fixed cost to enter the foreign market firms have to pay an iceberg
trade cost τn > 1, if they are not subsidized, or τs > 1 if they are subsidized. We assume that
the iceberg trade cost for subsidized firms τs < τn is lower than the one for non-subsidized




0 < s < 1. We simplify our analysis and look at the lower iceberg trade cost for subsidized
firms as lower red tape that they face when exporting. There is no transfer of resources in that
instance and the lower τs is not present in the government budget condition.
The profit of a producing firm from selling at home can be written as πh(a) = (ph(ω) −
a(ω))dh(w) if not subsidized and πh(κa) = (psh(ω)−κa(ω))dh(w) if subsidized. Firms optimize

















C, where for brevity δ ≡
(σ − 1)σ−1σ−σ. The profit of a producing firm from selling abroad can be written as πf (a) =
(pf (ω) − τna(ω))df (w) if not subsidized and πf (κa) = (psf (ω) − τsκa(ω))df (w) if subsidized.







The standard exogenous exit probability is denoted by γ. The value of a firm from entering
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the home market and after knowing its marginal cost equals v(a) = sπh(κa)/γ+(1−s)πh(a)/γ.
To find the threshold marginal cost aL, the value of the marginal firm must equal the fixed cost
of local market entry v(aL) = FL. One can therefore find
aL =
(








The threshold separating exporting from non-exporting subsidized firms can be found from









The threshold separating exporting from non-exporting non-subsidized firms can be found









With those marginal cost thresholds we can find the share of exporting firms within the
groups of subsidized and non-subsidized firms. The direct effect in our estimations is the share
of exporters within the group of subsidized firms minus the share of exporters within the group







Substituting for the cumulative distribution function of the Pareto distribution and the thresh-





















Notice that the direct effect does not depend on consumption expenditure or the aggregate

























sκ1−σ + 1− s
> 0.
We assume that the above inequality holds, which implies that ∂τs
∂s
is sufficiently low.
Intuitively, more firms are able to become exporters within the subsidized group as their
expected profits from selling abroad are on average higher than those of non-exporters. More
subsidized firms will find it optimal to pay the foreign market entry fixed cost. This is why the
likelihood for a subsidized firm to be an exporter is greater (the positive direct effect).
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Further, when more firms within a cluster are subsidized, the firm-specific iceberg trade
cost of subsidized firms is lower (our assumption that τs decreases in s), more firms enter the
foreign market relative to the number of firms that enter only the home market. The relative
share of subsidized exporters increases, which leads to the direct effect increasing in s.
The indirect effect is the share of non-subsidized exporting firms in all non-subsidized firms








We again substitute for the cumulative distribution function and the threshold marginal






















where anL is the marginal cost threshold separating entering from non-entering firms in a cluster
without subsidies, anEN is the threshold separating exporters from non-exporters and τn is the








and decreasing in s.
The theoretical discussion thus provides a basis for our empirical analysis. We expect to
find a positive and increasing in s direct effect and a negative and decreasing in s indirect
treatment effects.
A.2 First step estimation
We first estimate the average potential outcomes ȳ1s and ȳ
0
s corresponding to the two treatment
states (subsidized and non-subsidized) for each cluster. We identify the expected individual
outcomes for the two treatment states per cluster by regressing a firm level export dummy on
the treatment status. In order to take into account selection at the firm level, we estimate the
outcome equation using inverse propensity-score weighted regression and controlling for the
pre-treatment covariates, a so-called doubly-robust estimator (Bang and Robins, 2005, Hirano
et al., 2003).7
For each cluster, this implies that we firstly generate the firm-specific propensity-scores (p)
of being treated via a logistic regression with a rich list of pre-treatment covariates X subject
to balancing conditions being satisfied. The list and precise definition of the pre-treatment
covariates can be found in Table 1. Results are reported in Table 4. As we have 245 propensity
7The estimator is doubly robust as it provides two opportunities to adjust for selection on observables by
combining inverse probability reweighing with regression covariates adjustment. Our identifying assumption is,
of course, selection on observables. To the extent that there are unobservables that are correlated with both
the treatment conditional on observables and the export dummy, this would potentially bias our results.
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score estimations, we report summary statistics for the estimated coefficients. The last column
of Table 4 also shows that propensity score conditioning has done a remarkably good job at
balancing firm level observable covariates across the two groups of firms.
Using the obtained propensity scores we then estimate the following outcome equation by
cluster via inverse probability weighted regression. We impose the common support condition
to ensure that the propensity score is balanced across treated and non-treated firms:
yis = α + βdis + F (X; δ) + error; i = 1...N. (1)
where y is a firm level export dummy and F (.) represents a function of pre-treatment covariates
vector X. In the inverse probability weighting, treated firms receive a weight of 1/p and non-
treated firms 1/(1− p). From the regression we can then calculate the cluster specific potential












[α̂ + F (X; δ)] (2)
The average difference between the two potential outcomes in the above equation would be
an estimate of the average treatment effect in the absence of externalities, i.e., if the cluster-
specific level of treated firms did not matter.
In order to investigate whether there is a causal relationship between the cluster specific
treatment intensities s and the cluster specific potential outcomes, we implement a second step
estimation. This allows us to generate the direct and indirect treatment effects as described in
Section 3.
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A.3 Second step estimation
In the second step of the analysis we follow Hudgens and Halloran (2008) and treat ȳ1s and ȳ
0
s
estimated in the first step as the ”outcome” variables. The share of firms receiving a subsidy in
the cluster is taken to be the ”treatment” variable which in this case is continuous between 0 and
1. In order to control for selection at the cluster level, we employ the causal inference approach
for continuous treatments (Hirano and Imbens, 2004). A key result from this literature is that
causal inference can be conducted by conditioning on the generalized propensity score (GPS),
which is essentially the conditional density of the treatment given some pre-treatment balancing
covariates.
As we have a dosage variable sr that is continuous and bounded between 0 and 1, we generate
the GPS conditional on pre-treatment cluster level covariates, say Ĝr, using the fractional logit
model (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). A full list of these cluster level variables can be found
in Table 2. Marginal effects from the fractional logit model and the accompanying covariate
balancing tests are reported in Table 5. We also report results from covariate balancing test in
this second step estimation in the final two columns.8
8In order to check for covariate balancing conditional on generalized propensity scores (GPS), we adopt the
blocking approach proposed by Hirano and Imbens (2004). Accordingly we first divide clusters into 3 discrete
groups defined by treatment intensity (i.e., employment share of foreign firms), and then create 5 blocks within
each such group based on the estimated GPS quintiles. Within each block, we carry out difference-in-means
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We show the average p-values from these tests (null hypothesis: there is covariate balancing),
and it is reassuring to see that conditioning on GPS has done a very good job at covariate
balancing. What remains then is to calculate cluster level potential outcomes conditional on
Ĝr and sr using polynomial approximation (Hirano and Imbens, 2004). In this paper we use
the following quadratic approximation9
E[ydr |Ĝr, sr] = β0 + β1Ĝr + β2sr + β3Ĝrsr + β4Ĝ2r + β5s2r (3)











The so calculated potential outcomes allow us to generate sample-counterparts of the direct
and indirect treatment effects parameters described in Section 3.
Since the treatment variable in our second stage estimation is continuous, we gauge the
extent to which the balancing property of the covariate s in supported by the data, we follow
the ”blocking on GPS” approach advocated by Hirano and Imbens (2004). Our operational
scheme to test for can be summarized as follows:
• We divided the observations into four groups by treatment quartiles,
• Within each quartile we compute the GPS at the median value of the treatment variable,
and we then further divide the sample into ”blocks” based the quartiles of the this GPS
• For each covariate and treatment intensity quartile, we test for the mean difference be-
tween clusters that belong the treatment quartile in question and treatment quartiles that
belong to the same GPS ”block”.
Thus for each of our 7 covariates, we conduct 16 mean difference tests, the p-values of which
are summarized in table 6 below, shows that the balancing property is well supported by the
data.
tests between a treatment intensity group and the other two groups combined by conditioning on the GPS.
This process is repeated for each of the 3 treatment intensity groups and 9 covariates, entailing a total of 135
balancing tests.
9Note that individual parameters from such polynomial approximations do not have any behavioral inter-
pretation (Hirano and Imbens, 2004).
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A.4 Detail on common support conditions
We were careful to impose that the common support condition are satisfied at both the first
stage (i.e. cluster-specific) and second stage (i.e. cluster level) of the estimation in order to
comply with the requirements of propensity score based estimators.
1. Imposing common support at the first stage is quite straightforward since the treatment
variable is a binary variable. Thus after estimating the logistic regression and generating the
propensity-score, all control group firms with estimated propensity score below the minimum
value and above the maximum value of the propensity score variable for the subsidized firms
are removed from the analysis. This process is carried out for each of the 245 clusters, and in
the final analysis 5883 out of the original 172579 firms are found to lie outside the propensity
score support leaving us with 166696 (130201 control and 36495 treated) observations.
2. The treatment variable at second stage analysis is continuous as it is defined as the
proportion of subsidized firms in a cluster. While imposing common support in such cases is
not straightforward, the statistical and econometrics literature have made some strides towards
this end (e.g.Flores et al., 2012). In the spirit of this literature, we determine the generalised
propensity score common support or overlap region across clusters as follows:
• Divide the cluster level sample (N=245) into four based on treatment intensity (i.e. pro-
portion of subsidized firms) quartiles.
• For each quartile, evaluate the genearlized propensity score (GPS) at the median level
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of the treatment in that quartile. This is done for all units whether they belong to that
particular quartile or not.
• The overlap region with respect to a particular quartile is defined as consisting of all
observation from the other three quartile whose GPS is no more than 5% outside the
minimum or maximum GPS of that quartile.
• The above procedure is repeated for all quartiles, dropping firms whose GPS is outside
the overlap region of the quartile in question. This has resulted in the loss of 44 clusters,
restricting our estimating sample to 204 clusters that are comparable.
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